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Ugly and Interested Art. Modernity,
Freedom and democratization of
taste in F. Schlegel
Giorgia Cecchinato
1 The German intellectual world at the end of the 18th century was shocked by the French
revolution and by Kant's Copernican revolution. It was subsequently driven to question
the sense of modernity and the possibilities and instruments for understanding these
years  of  radical  changes.  The  debates  in  aesthetics  were  involved  in  this  wider
investigation  of  the  sense  of  modernity.  Hence,  the  old  Querelle  des  anciens  et  des
modernes came back with a new strength. In this context, Schiller's essay “On Naïve and
Sentimental Poetry” is particularly relevant1. On the one hand, in this essay Schiller
recognizes that the naive and natural character of ancient poetry has a fundamental
value, as an ideal of spontaneity and completeness. On the other hand, he ascribes a
new meaning to the artificial and sentimental character of modern poetry. Modernity
is characterized by the birth of consciousness and therefore by the kind of freedom
that raises from a non-natural and reflexive approach to life, which did not exist in
ancient times. This interpretative scheme was decisive for Hegel and it became crucial
for Schlegel too. 
2 My aim in the first part of the paper is to describe how Schlegel develops this idea of
Schiller’s  and to  show how he,  by  reflecting  on modernity,  leaves  out  the  ideal  of
beauty from aesthetics and develops a wider range of possibilities for what could be
recognized as a work of art. In the second part, I will demonstrate that Schlegel goes
beyond Schiller’s project of an aesthetic education, because his way of thinking about
art opens more possibility for dialogue and inclusion than Schiller’s model based on
beauty. This will allow us to see that Schlegel’s romanticism as an aesthetic theory can
be very useful and fruitful to us in contemporary era.
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The “interesting” as aesthetic category 
3 In the 1795 essay On the Study of Greek Poetry, Schlegel focuses on the ideal character of
ancient poetry, and in this way sheds light on all that was lacking in what was then
modern poetry. In later writings, in particular in the Preface to this 1795 essay, the
shortcomings of modernity and of modern art do not seem overly negative: on the one
hand,  antiquity  represents  the objectivity  of  artistic  ideal,  and it  is  not  possible  to
count on modern readers' possibility of having an objective taste or of being trained to
understand objectivity. On the other hand, modern taste is not the result of barbarity,
but of the distinctive feature of one’s times: individual and autonomous subjectivity.
The development of a free subject, no longer regulated by nature, results in the shift
from the key role of objectivity and harmony in the ancient aesthetic to the supremacy
of the “interesting” in the modern reflection on art. The “interesting” is the only main
guiding  idea  that  connects  the  various  different  tendencies  of  modern  art.  The
panorama of arts, and generally the modern era seems to be dominated by chaos and
anarchy. The artist seems to be apart from the whole of the Bildung, as if everyone acts
according their individualistic urges, without care for the others: “as a matter of fact
every artist exists for itself (fuer sich); he is an isolated egoist”2. Even the investigation
about an objective law of  beauty generated a multiplicity of  opinions and theories,
whose unity can only be found in the implicit doubt about the possibility of an objective
and  universal  aesthetic  law3.  In  every  sphere  chaos  prevails:  in  politics  as  a
consequence of the supremacy of the Third State after the French Revolution and the
tension of crown of Europe, in the sciences and arts because there is no more boundary
between art and science, and among arts. 
“The boundary between science and art, between true and beautiful are so confused
that  even  the  conviction  about  their  immutability  starts  to  sway  everywhere.
Philosophy poeticizes, poetry “philosophies””4. 
4 With  regard  to  such  chaos,  Schlegel  does  not  give  up  the  possibility  of  finding  a
common plane for modern culture. Rather he affirms that this absence of harmony and
order constitutes the central idea of all modern cultural experiences. In this way it is
possible to consider the European modern culture as a whole, a totality. In this whole
the art is characterized by the prevalence of the individual and interesting, that is what
the spectator wants: no more the beautiful, but something new, different, something
that stimulates reflection. In order to understand this peculiarity of modern culture,
we must consider the definition of Bildung as interaction between nature and reason. In
the ancient world nature is not only the moving force, but the main guide of human
production too; in the modern world production, culture in general, is guided by the
understanding. In this case the human act and deliberation are more important than
the natural element, and freedom dominates nature. The consequences of this change
of balances are both positive and negative.  On one hand when reason dominates it
seems possible to find a legislation that drives the cultural development to the ends
determined by reason. That’s why modern people are searching for law and they find it
in the normative character of the ancient art. On the other hand, when the imitation of
the  ancients  becomes  no  more  satisfactory  for  the  understanding,  the  free  will,
emancipated from every kind of law, acts in order to produce autonomously something
original. Understanding and freedom are very close to each other, but freedom without
a law easily becomes free will (arbitrium); in this case it produces only nostalgia and
pessimistic works. Modern culture is an artificial one, and it is searching for an ideal,
Ugly and Interested Art. Modernity, Freedom and democratization of taste in F...
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 15 | 2017
2
for a law, but doesn’t find one which is really normative. Consequently every artist
plays with different elements, as if he were a chemist he separates and unifies natural
elements in order to show his capacity to impose his will on matter, on nature5. It is
good to remember that Schlegel in a fragment written in 1797, affirms that the modern
era is a chemical one6, and about ten years later Goethe in his novel Elective affinities
describes the relationships of two couples with a chemical metaphor, and in this way
deals with the problem of the contrast between nature and free will. 
5 In the modern chemical era the artist does not aim at the creation of the beautiful, but
he tries to imprint his own subjectivity in original and interesting works. A work of art
is successful when it stimulates the curiosity of the spectator and piques his interest,
but a work that is original in the moment t1, can lose its stimulating character in the
moment t2 because the flow of time normalizes it. Every interesting work of art can be
made outdated by another one that is more interesting or interesting in another way.
In the ancient world the artist with a beautiful work reached the maximum of an ideal
and every beautiful work in itself represents and embodies a maximum. In the modern
world that is no longer possible, there is no more a maximum that each work in itself
embodies, the modern artist is searching for a maximum absolute, but, as we have seen,
interesting can not be absolute. This fact generated a “paradoxical situation”7: 
“The more one distances oneself from pure truth, the more one has partial opinions
about the truth and even more bigger is the whole of that what was the original,
and even more rare and pure the new originality”8
6 There is no work of art that is interesting in the absolute sense because there is no
aesthetical  law,  canon or purposiveness (Zweckmessigkeit).  Every work of  art  follows
other works of art, and obscures their originality. At the same time that work will be
obscured by a successive one more original and interesting. Every creation depends on
the previous one because it must exceed the grade of the previous one; in this sense it
belongs to the history of art. Actually that is not progress or an improvement in the
sense  of  the  Enlightenment  (Aufklaerung);  instead  in  this  dynamic  process  the
originality is always normalized and a new creation must every time invade the plane
of the ordinary world. In this process there is no progress, but a continuous break, a
breakdown of the world of art and its reconstitution thanks to other, more original
works of art. 
 
Interesting and critical activity
7 In  the  first  part  of  this  paper,  I  tried to  delineate  the theory of  the interesting in
Schlegel’s early work, On the Study of Greek Poetry. Now I’d like to highlight the most
meaningful  aspects  of  his  aesthetic  theory  with  respect  to,  on  the  one  hand,  the
aesthetics of the 18th century, in particular Kant and Schiller; and on the other hand
with respect to some aspects of the contemporary aesthetics9.
8 The introduction of the category of “interesting” explains and justifies the exclusion of
the beauty from the art world and moreover opens the doors of the art world to the
ugly and to the disgusting in a way that is very close to what Arthur Danto made two
centuries  after  Schlegel.  Finally  for  Schlegel,  as  for  Danto,  everything  can be  art10.
Furthermore the German philosopher delineates exactly what the art world is and what
are its boundaries: that is the set (whole thing) of objects that are produced by the free
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will, that manifests human freedom and intelligence and that raises interest and piques
reflection. 
9 At the same time Schlegel affirms the flexibility of the art world, considering that it is,
as the modern era, dominated by chaos, that means that science can become art and art
can make philosophy11. 
10 It is possible to better understand the way in which the artist and her public relate to
the precariousness and to the subjective and temporary nature of the works of art by
considering Schlegel’s successive reflections on the critical character of the creative
activity in both the production and reception of art. Schlegel distances himself from
the dogmatism of Winckelmann and Gottsched because for them works of art must be
judged on the basis of objective norms. But Schlegel distances himself from Kant too,
because he is not in accordance with the thesis of judgment intended as individuation
of the universal in the particular, even if, as in Kant, the universal is not a priori given
and must be found. In other words, the critic is not an instrument to eliminate the
particular and the contingent, the relative and the individual, as if these were only a
form  of  illusion  or  appearance  that  hides  something  universal  and  objective.  The
critical activity is rather the medium with which every individual and incomplete art-
work refers to the absolute and infinite idea of the art. The critic does not search for
the accordance between the particular and the universal, but instead it looks for the
valorization of the particular character of the work and its peculiarities. Consequently
it is not possible to achieve a definitive judgment on a work of art, but every judgment,
every  critic  contributes  to  its  completion  and  save  it  from  its  limits  and  relative
characters,  as  W.  Benjamin  highlighted.  The  critical  activity  is  a  reflection  on  the
condition of possibility of  a work and of a judgment about a work,  and finally is  a
reflection on the possibility of such a critical activity. That means at least that critic is
always aware of its temporary and provisional character and moreover it is aware of
the precariousness of the art. Although the critic must be aware of the fact that every
judgment on something that arouses an interest can not have can not have a neutral
character,  that  is  can  not  be  pronunciated without  the  intervention  of  desire  and
previous knowledge, that is: can not have disinterested character in the sense of Kant’s
Critique of judgment. Instead, every critical judgment, for Schlegel, involves the entire
individuality, the one of the critic and the one of the artist. 
11 The  critical  activity  in  Schlegel’s  sense,  is  not  a  Kantian  judgment  of  taste,  which
pretends that  the one who judges puts  aside his  particularity  to  reach a  universal,
neutral point of view. In the modern era the universality is lost, as the law of beauty.
Only the critic can save modernity from relativism, because the critic consists in the
awareness of  the relative character of  every judgment and in the awareness of the
presence of a more or less implicit interest. 
12 This way of understanding critical activity in art can have meaningful implications in
the political praxis12. As we know the romantic Philosophers together with Schelling
and Schiller considered art as the most effective activity in order to express and to
understand the human being. Hegel strongly critiques them because he does not agree
with the  theory  that  art  and philosophy of  art  can help  understand and solve  the
problems of modernity. 
13 In  his  epistolary  work,  “Letters  on  the  aesthetic  education”,  Schiller  affirm  the
possibility of ennobling the humanity trough art, and in this way of contributing to a
political renovation. The experience of the beauty becomes a sort of ground zero: all
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the strivings, rational and sensible in the experience of beauty are still. The particular
ends and cognitions are annihilated and in this way the space for the play of the beauty
is opened. But beauty doesn’t teach us anything, it does not command anything, it only
makes an open space for all types of dialogue. Schiller is inspired by the Kantian theory
of the sensus communis as an ideal society of judgers, in which every one can participate
in a dialogue from a neutral, universal point of view.
14 Whereas Kant with the theory of common sense refers only to an ideal justificatory
ground for the judgment of taste, Schiller transforms this theory in a political proposal
in  order  to  educate  the  sensibility  and  contributes  to  a  moral  (that  is  freel)
development of the political community. But he admits the utopian character of this
kind  of  education  and  implies  the  difficulty  of  such  a  pure  and  disinterested
experience. In the latest letter he ask “Where can we find such an aesthetic State?” and
he answers as follows: “in the hearts of the select few members of a small circle”13. 
15 In more than on one occasion Schlegel accuses Schiller that he did not really “digest”
Kantian Philosphy. In fact the ahistorical and disinterested character of the judgment
of beauty that we find in Kant, becomes in Schiller the key for making the political
community more just and free. 
16 Schlegel’s proposal seems certainly more realistic and appropriate: he affirms that art
as  well  as  other  products  of  human  reason,  such  as  the  State  (the  Republic)  and
philosophical  systems are based on artificiality (Kunstlichkeit)  and temporary nature
with which one must deal, because one can not annihilate or easily overlook them. The
right attitude is the critical one: it is important to be aware of the artificial, conditional,
individual, and interested character, which is the product of the understanding and of
our  judgments;  in  this  way  one  can  be  open  to  the  future  and  able  to  respect
individuality of others and to improve one’s own. 
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ABSTRACTS
The aim of  this  paper is  to describe how F.  Schlegel  develops F.  Schiller’s  conception of  the
modern art and to show how he, by reflecting on modernity, leaves out the ideal of beauty from
aesthetics and develops a wider range of possibilities for what could be recognized as a work of
art. Schlegel goes beyond Schiller’s project of an aesthetic education, because his way of thinking
about  art  opens  more  possibility  for  dialogue  and  inclusion  than  Schiller’s  model  based  on
beauty. This will allow us to see that Schlegel’s romanticism as an aesthetic theory can be very
useful and fruitful to us in contemporary era.
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